

THE CANADA-ONTARIO IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT:

Assessment and Options for Renewal

F. Leslie Seidle



School of Public Policy & Governance
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



APPLIED PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH
INFORMED BY ONTARIO'S REALITY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The signing of the Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) in 2005 was a significant step forward in federal-provincial-municipal cooperation to support immigrants to Ontario and represents a significant achievement for both governments. The COIA is up for renewal in 2011 and an assessment of the first agreement provides guidance for a renewed and improved agreement.

The COIA differs from the agreements signed by the federal government with British Columbia and Manitoba, who have both been given more autonomy by the federal government to run their own integration programs. The Agreement also differs from the one negotiated by Quebec, which grants Quebec full control not only of settlement services, but of selection as well.

Ontario has never considered pursuing a Quebec-style agreement, given that such an agreement would significantly reduce the role of the federal government in nation-building through immigration, with the two largest provinces running their own immigration programs.

However, our research demonstrates that greater control over settlement and integration services, on par with the agreements that the federal government has negotiated with BC and Manitoba, is both feasible and desirable. The upcoming negotiations and renewal of the COIA provide an opportunity to pursue devolution of these programs to Ontario in order to expand and improve services to its newcomers and help them integrate and prosper more quickly.

In this research report, Leslie Seidle examines the Ontario, Manitoba and BC federal-provincial agreements and identifies a number of successes and potential improvements that should govern the renegotiation of the next COIA.

The achievements of the COIA include enhanced funding for settlement and integration services, expanded programming, co-funding of Ontario Bridge Training projects, increased professionalization of the settlement sector, and the successful inclusion of the municipal sector. Some new programs, such as the Local Immigration Partnerships Initiative, have been particularly successful.

Yet problems, such as a lack of follow through on federal spending commitments, have emerged that must be corrected in a renewed agreement. BC and Manitoba have not experienced these challenges. The federal government has delivered on its financial commitments. More importantly, from a program design perspective, these provinces have developed innovative services that are tailored to the particular circumstances of newcomers. They are also better coordinated with the suite of other provincial programs that support integration, in areas as diverse as sport and recreation, early childhood education, family counselling, housing, employment, community mental health, and all of the various services offered through the provincially-run education system that connect with children.

There are also lessons to learn internationally. In a second companion Mowat Centre paper (*International Perspectives on Immigrant Service Provision*, May 2010), Myer Siemiatycki and Phil Triadafilopoulos examine the role of sub-national jurisdictions in immigrant settlement and integration in Australia, Germany, the United States and Britain. They find that Canada has been much more active, sophisticated and forward-looking in its immigrant settlement programs, but that some of these countries are catching up in important ways. There is broad recognition that sub-national jurisdictions can more quickly respond and successfully adapt settlement programs to meet local immigrant and community needs than national governments. As a result, they see a clear trend towards devolving these programs.

Mowat Centre recommendations emerging from these research papers:

- Based on the positive results in BC and Manitoba, the federal and Ontario governments should negotiate a devolution agreement to the Province. This will allow the provincial and municipal governments the power to introduce and manage more flexible programs for newcomers that are responsive to local circumstances and are coordinated with other provincial and municipal programs crucial to integration, such as education.
- Should a devolution agreement be negotiated, the Ontario government must put the funds in a separate envelope that cannot be cut or diverted to other non-settlement programming, report to the public the results of that spending, give the federal government appropriate credit for its financial contribution and agree to leave its own spending on programs intact.
- Should a devolution agreement fail to be negotiated, the eligibility criteria used by the federal government—both in terms of which programs they are willing to fund and which clients they are willing to serve—must be broadened. Too many good programs and too many needy newcomers fail to fit into the rigid boxes imposed by the federal government. These criteria significantly diminish Ontario's ability to integrate newcomers and strengthen the Canadian economy. For example, temporary foreign workers and new citizens should be able to access programs.
- Greater accountability and transparency to the Canadian public is necessary, regardless of whether a devolution agreement can be struck. The federal government does not currently report on how it uses its money on immigrant settlement in Ontario or other provinces.

These policy recommendations fulfill two complementary objectives: strengthen the Canadian economy by ensuring that newcomers integrate and participate as quickly as possible; and support newcomers to Canada by providing better, tailored and more coordinated integration and settlement programs and services.

THE CANADA-ONTARIO IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT: Assessment and Options for Renewal

by F. Leslie Seidle

FOR DECADES, ONTARIO has been a powerful magnet for immigration. In 1960, 52 per cent of the immigrants admitted to Canada gave Ontario as their intended destination.¹ Almost 50 years later, in 2008, the province received 45 per cent of the country's 247,243 new permanent residents, 78 per cent of whom settled in Toronto.² During this period, the composition of immigration changed radically, and it subsequently became clear that many recent arrivals were not faring as well as in previous decades. It is thus somewhat surprising that Ontario was the last province, in November 2005, to sign an immigration agreement with the Government of Canada.

The Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA) had a five-year term; in May 2010 an extension to March 31, 2011 was announced. This research study is intended as a contribution to the examination of options leading to the renewal of COIA.³ As background, this study begins by surveying some of the main developments that led to shared federal-provincial action in the field of immigration. The second section provides an overview of the federal government's approach to immigrant settlement and integration programming, and reviews the devolution agreements struck with Manitoba and British Columbia in the late 1990s and their implementation. This is followed by an assessment of COIA, including progress achieved and challenges that have emerged. The analyses of the three agreements draw on interviews with present and former officials from the respective provincial governments and Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), and leaders in the Ontario settlement sector. The fourth section is an assessment of the potential strengths and drawbacks of three options for the renewal of COIA: devolution, co-management and deepening the current framework. The study concludes with some observations about the broader implications of the forthcoming review of COIA.

THE PATH TO SHARED FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL ACTION

Under the *Constitution Act, 1867*, the federal and provincial governments have concurrent jurisdiction over immigration; the former has paramountcy. In 1867, concurrency was provided for only one other matter, agriculture.⁴ In light of the rather centralized form of federalism established at Confederation, it may seem surprising that provincial governments were given any authority to legislate on immigration. Rob Vineberg has provided the following explanation: as immigration had been a preoccupation of the (pre-Confederation) colonial governments for more than a century, “it only made sense that all levels of an under-populated agrarian country would be actively interested in immigration and agriculture.”⁵

In a 1974 green paper issued as part of its immigration policy review, the government stated that it intended to involve provincial governments more closely in immigration issues.

As the country evolved, and particularly as the federal government exercised leadership in social policy following the Second World War, executive federalism came to play an important role in a number of policy fields. With immigration, this did not occur until a good deal later. Although federal-provincial conferences were held annually between 1868 and 1874, what Vineberg describes as the “first modern-era meeting of federal-provincial-territorial ministers responsible for immigration” did not take place until October 2002. A practice of annual meetings now applies.⁶

The first intergovernmental immigration agreement, which resulted from the 1868 conference, allowed provincial governments to appoint immigration agents abroad. However, for most of the following century the federal government “perceived immigration as a national program and...orchestrated provincial involvement only as necessary.”⁷ In the 1970s, this began to change. In a 1974 green paper issued as part of its immigration policy review, the government stated that it intended to involve provincial governments more closely in immigration issues. The new Immigration Act adopted in 1976 provided that the minister could “enter into an agreement with any province...for the purpose of facilitating the formulation, coordination and implementation of immigration policies and programs.”⁸

Prior to adoption of the 1976 act, policy-makers in Quebec, concerned by projections of the province’s slowing population growth, began considering how to attract more immigrants. As it had done in other areas during the Quiet Revolution, the provincial government began asserting its authority by seeking a role in recruitment.⁹ In 1971, the first of four immigration agreements with the federal government was signed. Its terms were modest: the Quebec govern-

ment was authorized to post an “orientation officer” (counsellor) in five designated cities and possibly in other locations.¹⁰

In the 1978 agreement, Quebec acquired a role in immigrant selection, and in the 1991 McDougall/Gagnon-Tremblay accord it was given the power to select all economic immigrants to the province (the federal government can overrule candidates only for serious security or medical reasons).¹¹ The Quebec government also acquired the capacity to determine the level of immigration to the province.¹²

In addition, Quebec was given the responsibility for providing all reception and integration services for new arrivals. To that end, the federal government provides Quebec with an annual grant.¹³

Each year’s payment is calculated according to an ‘escalation factor’ (annex B to the accord). The annual grant is now worth several times the initial payment of \$75 million made in 1991-92 (see Table 1).

Following implementation of the 1976 act, a number of other provinces expressed interest in an immigration agreement. The first were signed with Nova Scotia and Saskatchewan in 1978, and a number of others followed. However, none of these allowed for a provincial role in selection. In the early 1990s, the three Prairie provinces and some of the Atlantic provinces began to express concern about not receiving their share of immigrants. Manitoba raised an additional issue: that, as a result of the selection criteria for economic immigrants (the points system introduced by the 1976 act), the province’s need for workers in skilled and semi-skilled trades was not being met. The federal government, unwilling to copy the Canada-Quebec accord, developed a Provincial Nominee Program (PNP) that would allow each province

or territory “to identify a limited number of economic immigrants to meet specific regional needs and/or to receive priority attention for immigration processing.”¹⁴

The new program was intended to be modest, and the target for 1996 was set at 1000 nominees.

This innovation led to a series of intergovernmental agreements.¹⁵ Manitoba was the first province to open negotiations and, since its 1998 agreement, has used the PNP quite aggressively to attract more immigrants (this is discussed further in the next section). All the other

provinces, except Quebec, have since signed agreements on provincial nominees, as have Yukon and the Northwest Territories. It was

The result is a system in which provincial governments—as well as other actors such as employers and universities—share significant influence with the federal government over the composition of immigration to Canada.

projected that 20,000 economic immigrants would arrive in 2009 through PNPs, and CIC projects this could rise to 40,000 in 2010.¹⁶ Provincial governments have considerable flexibility to set criteria for choosing nominees, and the programs have become highly diverse and quite complex.¹⁷ Along with other changes to the immigration system, notably the introduction of the Canadian Experience Class¹⁸ in 2008, the result is a system in which provincial governments—as well as other actors such as employers and universities—share significant influence with the federal government over the composition of immigration to Canada.¹⁹

INTEGRATION SERVICES AND THE MANITOBA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA AGREEMENTS

Settlement services funded by the federal government began in 1949 with a program to help refugees and the families of Canadian soldiers adjust to Canadian life.²⁰ In 1953, all provinces but Quebec signed a language training agreement. The federal government’s

settlement and integration programs grew considerably in subsequent decades. Unlike the situation in many immigrant-receiving countries, these services are not delivered by the public sector but by a host of nongovernmental organizations—often referred to as service provider organizations (SPOs)—through quasi-contractual contribution agreements with governments. A 2008 study reported that CIC had more than 300 such agreements.²¹ Some SPOs are also funded by provincial governments, foundations (e.g. Maytree) and other non-profit organizations such as the United Way.

Spending by CIC on integration programs (including transfers to provincial governments) has risen significantly in recent years. The increased funding for programming in Ontario under COIA accounts for part of the increase; in addition, funding for provinces other than Quebec rose as a result of the 2006 federal budget (see below). Projected spending for CIC's integration program (including the three provincial transfers) for 2010-11 is slightly more than \$1 billion (see Table 1). Other federal departments, notably Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, also have programs to facilitate the economic and social integration of newcomers.

TABLE 1. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION CANADA (CIC) SPENDING/PROJECTED SPENDING ON INTEGRATION SERVICES FOR NEWCOMERS TO CANADA

YEAR	OVERALL SPENDING ON "PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF NEWCOMERS" (\$)	GRANTS FOR CANADA-QUEBEC ACCORD ON IMMIGRATION (\$)	TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT OF MANITOBA (\$)	TRANSFERS TO GOVERNMENT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA (\$)	CIC SPENDING IN ONTARIO (\$)
2000-2001	327,816,972	104,140,000	4,981,100	46,533,126	*
2001-2002	333,081,891	111,723,000	5,027,800	42,723,958	*
2002-2003	370,638,426	157,380,000	5,521,800	39,725,763	*
2003-2004	365,438,014	149,903,000	6,592,000	36,915,469	*
2004-2005	386,144,411	160,786,000	7,353,200	37,170,407	109,600,000
2005-2006	445,024,442	188,353,000	8,196,200	39,522,901	159,600,000
2006-2007	550,622,407	193,893,200	11,985,600	68,935,594	224,600,000
2007-2008	667,860,463	198,193,523	16,741,500	79,242,365	294,600,000
2008-2009	940,800,000	237,500,000	25,387,000	106,399,529	359,600,000
2009-2010	921,500,000	234,200,000	27,941,126	120,729,982	429,600,000
2010-2011	1,076,600,000	253,700,000	29,429,097	114,079,030	408,000,000

*Not available

Note: Entries in *italics* are projections or estimates.

Sources:

Overall spending: Public Accounts of Canada (various years) at: http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/index.html; CIC, Report on Plans and Priorities (various years) at: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/index.asp>

Grants for Canada-Quebec Accord: Public Accounts of Canada (various years) at:

http://epe.lac-bac.gc.ca/100/201/301/public_accounts_can/index.htm; "Settlement Funding Allocations" backgrounders (various

years) at: <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/department/media/archives.asp>

Transfers to Manitoba: Manitoba Labour and Immigration, Annual Reports at:

<http://www.gov.mb.ca/labour/annualreports/annualreport.html>; "Settlement Funding Allocations" backgrounders (as above)

Transfers to BC: Welcome BC, Ministry of Advanced Education and Labour Market Development

Federal spending in Ontario: For 2005-10 - CIC 2005a; for 2010-11 - backgrounder "Settlement Funding Allocations for 2010-11" (as above). CIC did not spend the full projected amounts in any of the years since 2005-06 (see text).

Until recently, CIC structured most of its funding for integration services according to three programs:²²

- **Immigrant Settlement and Adaptation**

Program (ISAP): Funding for programs to assist immigrants' access services and integration into their community, including reception and orientation services, translation and interpretation services, employment assistance and counselling.

- **Language Instruction for Newcomers to**

Canada (LINC): Funding to SPOs that offer instruction in either official language to adult immigrants for up to three years from the time they begin training.

- **Host Program:** matches immigrants with established Canadians who assist the former to develop language skills, learn about Canadian society and develop networks.

In 2008, CIC introduced a 'modernized' approach to settlement programming that is intended to allow greater flexibility and lighten the reporting requirements for SPOs. Although the policy directions remain similar to those of the three programs described above, there is a greater emphasis on outcomes. SPOs are now required to indicate how their projects will contribute to one of five expected results by drawing from activities in six 'streams.'²³

Following the 1991 accord, the government of Quebec assumed responsibility for all reception and integration services provided in the province. This did not lead to calls from other provincial governments for the same treatment. Rather, the federal government made the opening move that led to some significant changes in this area. As part of its Program Review exercise (launched in 1994), which was intended to

reduce federal government spending and the deficit, the Government of Canada offered to withdraw from managing integration services in the other provinces.²⁴

Only the governments of Manitoba and British Columbia (BC) accepted the offer. The ensuing agreements and their implementation are the subject of the remainder of this section.

CANADA-MANITOBA IMMIGRATION AGREEMENTS

Demographic trends were a major factor leading to Manitoba's 1996 agreement. A relatively broad spectrum of interests called for increased immigration to the province, and this objective was supported by both Conservative and New Democratic party governments.²⁵ Although the 1996 agreement only provided for the negotiation of an annex on the selection of provincial nominees (PNs), a pilot project to recruit sewing machine operators was launched the same year. The ensuing negotiations, which one participant described as fairly congenial, led to the 1998 annexes on PNs and settlement services.²⁶

The PNP began modestly: for each of the first two years, the provincial government was allowed to nominate 200 immigrants and their families. The program grew more rapidly than expected and higher limits were agreed for subsequent years. When the Canada-Manitoba agreement was renewed in 2003,²⁷ the cap was removed.²⁸ Immigration to Manitoba has increased considerably in recent years. In 2000, the province received 4,610 immigrants (i.e. principal applicants and dependants).²⁹

By 2008, this had risen to 11,221, 71 per cent of whom came as PNs.³⁰ (In 2008, 36 per cent of the permanent residents admitted to Canada as provincial/territorial nominees were destined for Manitoba.) Manitoba has also been quite successful in encouraging immigrants to settle in smaller communities: in 2008, 34 per cent

of the PNPs to the province went to communities other than Winnipeg. In addition, the outcomes of Manitoba immigrants are among the most favourable in the country. For example, in 2009 the unemployment rate for immigrants in Manitoba (4.8 per cent) was lower than the corresponding rate in any other province.³¹

On settlement and integration services, the annual transfer from CIC has increased more than six-fold (in nominal terms) since 1998 (see Table 1). In 2007-08, the Manitoba government contributed an additional \$2.5 million for programming in this area.³² As with most of the CIC programs, Manitoba's services are delivered by SPOs under contribution agreements. In 2009-10, Labour and Immigration Manitoba provided \$10.7 million to 85 service providers. An additional \$16.6 million was provided to 104 service providers for the delivery of Adult English

as an Additional Language (EAL) programming. In light of the increased number of immigrants in the province, the demand for such services has risen considerably. For example, the number of immigrants in Adult EAL classes grew from 3,018 in 2002-03 to more than 16,000 in 2009-10.³³ Details of Manitoba's programming and information on 'results achieved' are provided in the ministry's annual report to CIC. The latter is a requirement of the agreement, as is the submission of a yearly service plan.

As with the PNP, implementation of the settlement services agreement has benefited from stakeholder support and involvement. For example, a language learning program was developed for women who find it difficult to attend courses during regular training hours; another program targets recently arrived seniors. Yet another program, which is cost-shared with employers, provides newcomers with job-specific language

training during the workday. According to one study, "[s]uch creative and innovative programs would not [have been] possible under the federal program, service providers argue."³⁴

As Manitoba's programming expanded, steps were taken to consolidate or link certain services. For example, all new arrivals are strongly encouraged to take part in the four-week Entry Program. The program, which is delivered by Altered Minds, Inc., provides all newcomers to Winnipeg with information and counselling to help ease their transition to life in Manitoba. The sessions are tailored to participants' language ability.

For those with a low level of fluency in English, the course is in effect an introduction to English as a second language (in some cases, interpreters are present). For those who are more fluent in English, some of the sessions are intended to help participants

improve their job-related language skills. In addition, Labour and Immigration Manitoba has been developing a centralized registration and referral system for various services (e.g. language training, employment advice) required by new arrivals. Although not strictly a 'single window' access point, this innovation ought to assist new arrivals in accessing what must at times seem like a bewildering range of services.

In addition to trying to keep up with the demand for services and the continuing need to be responsive to stakeholders, challenges remain. According to one study:

Integration of immigration with support from other policy sectors has not always happened—the shortage of affordable housing to accommodate new arrivals for example. Creating infrastructure in small

In 2009 the unemployment rate for immigrants in Manitoba (4.8 per cent) was lower than the corresponding rate in any other province.

centres to provide the necessary language training, cultural opportunities and employment support is expensive.³⁵

Despite such difficulties, it is clear that the Manitoba government has shown creativity in adapting and improving its immigrant integration services. Devolution also gave it the ‘space’ to develop new programs that are linked to the demographic objectives that the province has pursued with considerable success.

CANADA-BRITISH COLUMBIA IMMIGRATION AGREEMENTS

BC is a major gateway for immigration to Canada. In 2008, the province received 18 per cent of the permanent residents admitted to Canada—slightly below Quebec’s share.³⁶ The federal government and BC first struck an immigration agreement in 1998. It was renewed in 2004 for five years and then extended for a year.³⁷ A renewed agreement was signed in April 2010.³⁸ As with its predecessors, the 2010 agreement includes an annex on provincial nominees.³⁹

Most settlement and integration services were devolved to BC through the 1998 agreement. The ensuing period has seen a strong emphasis on English language ability as a key to meaningful employment. WelcomeBC, a branch of the Ministry of Advanced Education and Labour Market Development, currently has administrative responsibility for most programs for newcomers (the most important of which is the BC Settlement and Adaptation Program [BCSAP]) and the Welcoming Communities and Inclusive Workplace programs. The increase in the annual transfers following the 2006 federal budget (see Table 1) has led to a number of innovations, including expanded language training (some of which has a labour market component), the placement of settlement workers in schools, and programs targeted at particular groups, including seniors.^{40,41} In addition,

a number of pilot programs have been launched. One of these, “Immigrant parents as literary supporters,” is aimed at helping parents develop the English-language abilities of their preschool children.⁴² According to an anonymous senior ministry official, because the programs are “administered locally” it was possible to make changes such as these relatively quickly.

As of April 2010, WelcomeBC’s programs were delivered through 377 contracts with more than 100 SPOs.⁴³ Programming in this area has a relatively strong focus on results, in part because the *BC Budget Transparency and Accountability Act* requires ministries to develop three-year service plans (including performance measures) and service plan reports. Current and former BCSAP clients are surveyed annually, and some of the findings are included in the annual reports to CIC. For example, the 2007-08 report noted that more than 3,500 current and former BCSAP clients had been surveyed in autumn 2007, and that satisfaction rates were high and client outcomes were improving.⁴⁴ The 2010 agreement obliges BC to report more extensively on outputs and outcomes. The latter include indicators on English ability, ability to pursue employment goals and knowledge of “Canadian systems and culture.”⁴⁵

Controversy about how BC uses the transfer emerged when the government decided that about half the \$45.4 million provided by the federal government for 1999-2000 would be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund (CRF); the funds were then accounted for under the province’s block funding to postsecondary institutions that deliver English second-language (ESL) courses. The decision was criticized on the grounds that this replaced BC’s previous contribution to ESL teaching, and that, counter to the agreement, participants had to pay tuition fees. Following the increase in the transfers that began in 2006-07, the BC government froze the amount paid into the CRF at \$17.1 million.⁴⁶ This issue has remained a point of contention with the settlement

sector and CIC, who suggest that BC has violated the spirit of the agreement. Pressure from the latter increased in recent years, and the 2010 agreement states that BC will demonstrate in its annual report to CIC that “100% of the funds... will be spent exclusively on the design, administration, delivery, performance measurement and evaluation of settlement and integration services.”⁴⁷

The process in BC for funding projects submitted by SPOs has changed considerably. Following its election in 2001, the Liberal government decided to introduce a government-wide tendering process: the ministry issues a request for proposals, which is open to service providers in the non-profit and for-profit sectors; following review of the submissions, contracts are awarded to the winning ‘bidders’. This change was meant to bring greater fairness and broaden the circle of organizations being funded.⁴⁸ According to one experienced leader in the immigrant-serving sector, the impact was “broad and deep”: “Some agencies with long and good settlement service histories lost key service contracts; some smaller agencies lost so much of their ... budgets that they were challenged to keep their doors open...”⁴⁹

Commenting on this transition, a BC official interviewed for this study suggested the policy change did lead to opportunities for collaboration among SPOs. There are now several umbrella organizations that are interlocutors with the government. As BC begins implementing its third immigration agreement, it is clear that the immigrant-serving sector in BC remains highly dynamic, and that a spirit of adaptation lies behind the BC government’s settlement and integration programming.

The significant experience of the Manitoba and BC governments in managing settlement and integration programs demonstrates that devolution opened the door to innovation in program design and greater responsiveness to stakeholders. The increased federal funding during the past several years has led to an expansion of services, notably in the important area of language training. There have, nevertheless, been challenges, although in BC some of the issues that arose were in response to policy decisions not directed solely at settlement programs. As we shall see in the following section, the implementation of COIA has also presented certain difficulties, some of which the two governments will be required to face as they negotiate a renewed agreement.

As BC begins implementing its third immigration agreement, it is clear that the immigrant-serving sector in BC remains highly dynamic, and that a spirit of adaptation lies behind the BC government’s settlement and integration programming.

CANADA-ONTARIO IMMIGRATION AGREEMENTS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES

While significant change was taking place in Manitoba and BC, settlement and integration services in Ontario continued to be administered by CIC. Although devolution was offered to Ontario during Program Review in the mid-1990s (see above), the Conservative government was not interested. In fact, it cut spending on some of the settlement services Ontario was providing. The dynamic changed following the election of Dalton McGuinty's Liberal government in October 2003.⁵⁰ Concerned that the level of federal spending on these services in Ontario had remained unchanged for quite some time, McGuinty began to press this as one of a number of 'fair share' arguments, with reference to the size and annual growth of Quebec's grant. Another important factor was concern about the declining outcomes of newcomers. For example, between 1980 and 2005, the median income of immigrant men who arrived in the previous 10 years dropped from 85 to 63 cents for each dollar of employment income received by Canadian-born men (a decline of 26 per cent).⁵¹ For some policy makers, more effective integration programs were a key to improved job and other opportunities for newcomers and their families.

OVERVIEW OF COIA

In early discussions with the federal government, Ontario officials raised the possibility of devolution, but this was not presented as a firm 'bottom line'. Paul Martin's government, in part reflecting opposition to federal disengagement among Liberal MPs, was opposed to such a move.

Discussions between the two governments nevertheless began, and in May 2004 they signed a letter of intent to launch negotiations on an immigration agreement. Anticipating some of the elements of COIA, the news release stated that this "pave[d] the way for

municipalities to have a voice in immigration issues in [the forthcoming] negotiations" through a "municipal committee" to be chaired by the federal and Ontario deputy ministers and a representative of the Association of Municipalities of Ontario.⁵² This move reflected the priority the Martin government attached to enhanced federal engagement with cities (articulated in its "New Deal for Cities and Communities").

As the negotiations proceeded, funding was the major sticking point. The federal government initially rejected the major increase in settlement spending Ontario requested. According to a participant in the negotiations, Ontario indicated it would agree to launch a PNP (which the federal government wanted) only if federal settlement funding were significantly increased.⁵³ The negotiations dragged on until autumn 2005. Then, with a federal election in the offing, Martin made an offer that apparently came close to Ontario's initial request. This clinched the deal, and the agreement was signed on 21 November 2005.⁵⁴

Although the main focus of the rest of this section is on COIA's impact on settlement and integration services (Annex D to the agreement), it is important to mention some of its other elements.

- There is a commitment (Annex C) to launch a pilot PNP within a year of the signing of the agreement.⁵⁵
- There are specific modalities for the involvement of municipalities in planning and discussions on immigration and settlement (Annex F). In addition, the two governments committed to signing a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the City of Toronto within nine months. (The MOU was signed in September 2006.)

- The governance mechanisms are more extensive than in the Manitoba and BC agreements. COIA provides for a Joint Steering Committee (JSC) to oversee implementation of the agreement; it is to meet at least once a year to approve the annual joint priorities and review progress during the preceding year. It is supported by a Management Committee, which may establish working groups to implement priorities approved by the JSC. The annex on municipal involvement and the MOU with the City of Toronto provide for additional governance bodies and representation on working groups.

When COIA was announced, the federal minister, Joe Volpe, described the agreement in the following terms: “This is a significant milestone, laying a foundation for the governments of Canada and Ontario to work together in collaboration with municipalities and official language minorities to improve the social and economic integration of immigrants in the province.”⁵⁶ His provincial counterpart, Mike Colle, referred to the “history-making investment in the successful integration of the 125,000 new immigrants Ontario welcomes each year.”⁵⁷ Perhaps not surprisingly, given its scope, implementation of COIA has presented challenges. Before addressing these, it is important to review some of the significant benefits that have flowed from the agreement.

PROGRESS UNDER COIA

Reading the main text of COIA and its annexes, one is struck by its breadth. Space does not permit a full assessment of the progress that has been made on all its elements. Below are some of the main achievements in the settlement/integration field.

Enhanced funding for settlement and integration services

When asked about COIA's achievements, virtually all the interviewees from Ontario mentioned “the money.” In this regard, the agreement provided the following:

8.1 Beyond the annual settlement funding allocated in Ontario, in the order of \$109.6 M [million] in 2004-05, Canada agrees to invest additional resources for settlement services and language training for prospective immigrants to, and immigrants residing in Ontario. Canada commits to providing incremental funding that will grow over a five-year period to reach a cumulative total of \$920 M in new investments by 2009-10. For planning purposes, this incremental funding is projected to be disbursed [as follows]:

2005-06	- \$50 M
2006-07	- \$115 M
2007-08	- \$185 M
2008-09	- \$250 M
2009-10	- \$320 M

By 2009-10, CIC's projected spending on settlement services in Ontario had grown almost four-fold from the 2004-05 level (see Table 1). For Ratna Omidvar of the Maytree Foundation, this “massive inflow” meant that Ontario would receive a fairer share of the federal government's budget for such services compared to other provinces.⁵⁸

The COIA funding also had an impact beyond Ontario. A number of other provinces were not content that their allocations (whether through transfers or as a share of CIC program spending) would remain the same. The BC and Alberta ministers made their case in letters to the federal minister, and pressure was exerted through other channels.⁵⁹ Sensitive to these ‘fair share’ arguments, the Harper government's 2006 budget announced

that CIC's settlement and integration budget would be increased by \$307 million over two years.

Expanded programming

Innovations and program enhancements since COIA was signed include the following:

- Language training, which accounts for about 70 per cent of CIC's spending on settlement services in Ontario, has been enhanced considerably: by the end of 2008-09, there were 31 per cent more language learning providers and 76 per cent more classes.⁶⁰ Newcomers may now continue language training to LINC level 7 instead of level 5 (which was previously the cut-off point).
- Co-funding of Bridge Training projects, which were originally developed by Ontario in 2001. These projects allow newcomers to take additional training (including job-related language courses) in order to obtain their licence or certificate in their profession or trade.⁶¹ By the end of 2008-09, there were 100 active projects under this program, 40 of which had been introduced in that fiscal year.⁶²
- The program for the placement of settlement workers in schools was expanded, and a new settlement worker program for libraries was introduced. There have been discussions about expanding the settlement worker program to hospitals, and a pilot project is in place at the Hospital for Sick Children.

These experiments with flexibility in programming—if not in terms of eligible clients—have been greeted with praise. Commenting on these and other developments of the past few years, Omidvar said that one of COIA's successes has been the “openness to new ideas and

new stakeholders.”⁶³

Growth in the settlement sector

One positive impact of the COIA has been the growth and professionalization of the settlement sector. This was explicitly one of the goals of COIA and it appears to have been met. Commenting on COIA's impact on the immigrant-serving community, Debbie Douglas, executive director of the Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI), stated that the sector “has exploded.”⁶⁴ The number of organizations has increased considerably, and many of the established ones have expanded and further developed their capacity. In Omidvar's assessment, they have also acquired “greater clout.”

Involvement of the municipal sector

A number of interviewees commented that the provisions for involvement of municipalities constitute an achievement. The City of Toronto clearly saw the MOU (see above) as an important step in that it acquired a ‘seat at the table’ with the federal and provincial governments. City of Toronto officials have apparently taken their role seriously (one CIC official suggested Toronto representatives have been aggressive in demanding a say in policy development). A concrete example of collaboration with municipalities is the Local Immigration Partnerships (LIP) Initiative, which was proposed by the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration (MCI) and developed with CIC. LIPs bring together representatives of municipal government, SPOs, newcomer communities and employers to develop and implement approaches to foster immigrant integration.⁶⁵ By late 2009, CIC funding for LIPs had been distributed to some 30 communities. In a March 2010 report, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration highlighted the LIP initiative as a best practice in settlement services. The committee recommended CIC continue supporting the development of LIPs in Ontario and explore the potential of pilot projects in other provinces.⁶⁶

CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING COIA

In light of the extensive changes that flowed from COIA, it is understandable that the parties encountered difficulties. Two related challenges will be addressed here: the under-spending of the additional resources from COIA; and the problems that CIC's administrative processes present to the settlement sector.

Spending the additional resources

By April 1, 2009, \$407 million of the \$600 million designated for the first four years of COIA had been spent.⁶⁷ This means that almost one-third of the COIA funding for the period 2005-09 had not been spent. Commenting on this, the Ontario Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Dr. Eric Hoskins, stated in April 2010 that “[t]he federal government has in our view not lived up to its funding commitment.”⁶⁸ His predecessors had also expressed their disappointment with the pace of the COIA spending.

Based on what CIC officials and others told the author, the under-spending can be partly explained by the following developments:

- One of COIA's requirements was the preparation of a Strategic Plan for Settlement and Language Training. The process, which included extensive consultations with almost 700 stakeholders, lasted until December 2006.
- Implementation occurred at a time when the federal government's financial management and related rules were being tightened considerably in part as a result of the *Accountability Act* that took effect in late 2006.
- Additional staffing in CIC's Ontario offices and at headquarters had to be carried out. A former senior Ontario official suggested CIC was not well prepared for this stage of the implementation process. The lack of continuity ('churn'), staff turnover and departures within CIC complicated matters.
- By their nature, developing multi-partner initiatives such as the LIPs is quite time-consuming; the same is true for the expansion of programs into communities that did not previously benefit from such services.

COIA was an important achievement for governments and newcomers, but remains a work in progress.

By April 1, 2009, \$407 million of the \$600 million designated for the first four years of COIA had been spent. This means that almost one-third of the COIA funding for the period 2005-09 had not been spent.

- Although the increased spending created new opportunities for SPOs, many of them did not yet have sufficient staff and other capacities to develop funding proposals. Nevertheless, by early 2009, the number of funding agreements had increased by 97 per cent compared to the pre-COIA period.⁶⁹

A further issue that needs to be highlighted concerns eligibility. CIC-funded settlement and integration programs are open only to permanent residents. Among the groups that do not qualify are newcomers who have become Canadian citizens and temporary foreign workers (TFWs). The first group includes spouses who, for various reasons, may not have been able to benefit from settlement services during their initial years in Canada. Their integration into Canadian society would be facilitated if they could access language training. The number of TFWs in Ontario has risen considerably in recent years (there were 91,276 in the province in December 2008).⁷⁰ Because some of these workers may become permanent residents through the Canadian Experience Class, it has been suggested that TFWs should be eligible for settlement programs.⁷¹ In addition, labour market programs such as internships do not qualify for CIC funding. Settlement services offered by the Ontario government are not restricted to permanent residents.⁷² Some interviewees pointed out that if the CIC eligibility criteria were broader, additional projects would have been proposed and a greater share of the COIA funding would have been spent.

CIC's administrative processes

CIC's view on how it manages settlement funding is as follows: "We can only commit taxpayers money when we are satisfied that service-providing organizations have the structure and appropriate controls in place to ensure due diligence is exercised and that we get value for money."⁷³ On the face of it, few would quarrel with this statement. However, one CIC official told the author that the department spends too much time reviewing proposals before taking decisions. Another interviewee mentioned that it sometimes takes too long for CIC's Toronto office to get approvals from headquarters. As CIC's 'modernized' approach (see above) is implemented and relationships with SPOs and other stakeholders in Ontario mature further, perhaps some of CIC's processes will become somewhat less laborious. This would certainly be a positive development.

Before turning to options for the renewal of COIA, it should be said that, despite these and other difficulties, COIA was an important achievement. Settlement and integration services for Ontario's large immigrant popula-

tion have been expanded, and some worthwhile new programs have been launched. The settlement sector has grown and acquired added influence. In addition, because it opened the door to participation by a number of Ontario's municipalities, COIA can be seen as an innovative example of multilevel governance. The agreement nevertheless remains a work in progress.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THE CANADA-ONTARIO IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT

In light of the extension of COIA, the federal and Ontario governments have until March 31, 2011 to approve a new or renewed agreement. As a potential contribution to this debate, this final section discusses three options—devolution, co-management, and the current framework with enhanced collaboration. The discussion draws on experience during the past decade in Manitoba, British Columbia and Alberta (for the co-management option) and observations offered by interviewees. The potential strengths and drawbacks of the three options are summarized in Table 2.

DEVOLUTION

As highlighted in the 2010 provincial Budget, Ontario is seeking the devolution of settlement and integration services now managed by CIC. In light of the scale of activity involved, devolution would be a huge step.

If CIC withdrew from its present settlement activities in Ontario and provided an annual transfer to MCI, the latter would need to expand considerably its capacity to administer a range of programs and literally hundreds of contribution agreements. The transition would take a certain amount of time, but steps would need to be taken to prevent an interruption in the provision of settlement services. Devolution nevertheless presents a number of potential advantages for the Ontario government, including opportunities to focus more explicitly on improving immigrant outcomes and to work more closely with other Ontario ministries whose programs have an important impact on the life chances of newcomers and their families. This would contribute to what one key informant described as the 'mainstreaming' of immigrant integration—that is, integrating settlement programs with other, largely provincial, programs including education, family counselling, community mental health, and sport and recreation. Policy coherence across program areas relevant to integration—most of which are currently delivered by the provincial and municipal governments—would

Devolution nevertheless presents a number of potential advantages for the Ontario government, including opportunities to focus more explicitly on improving immigrant outcomes and to work more closely with other Ontario ministries whose programs have an important impact on the life chances of newcomers and their families.

likely increase. According to several people interviewed, this would improve outcomes and strengthen Canada's ability to help immigrants adapt to their new country.

Accountability to Ontarians could also improve. As with the Manitoba and BC agreements, MCI would no doubt be required to submit a yearly service plan and annual report to CIC; the latter would probably include data on outcomes (as with the new BC agreement). This would be an improvement compared to the present situation—more so if the annual reports were made public (as the Manitoba and BC reports should be). Appropriate and public credit to the federal government for funding would also be necessary.

As negotiations proceed, it is not clear how the federal government will respond. The federal Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, Jason Kenney, has expressed strong reservations about devolution. As Naomi Alboim (interview) pointed out to the author, settlement programming provides the federal government with links to dozens of ethno-cultural communities; this can be helpful in particular situations (she cited the example of the support the Vietnamese community provided for the 'boat people' from their former country in the 1970s).⁷⁴

Devolution to Ontario would leave CIC with management of these services for Alberta, Saskatchewan and the four Atlantic provinces. The federal government would thus lose some of its capacity to foster policy coherence for immigrant settlement and integration (although this has already been significantly diminished as a result of devolution to Quebec, BC and Manitoba). This could be seen as a further move towards an immigration system that, in some analysts' view, is becoming increasingly diffuse.⁷⁵ (Some of those worried about a diminished federal role are particularly concerned about the federal government's declining role in selection.)

The settlement community has a range of views on the future of COIA. For example, OCASI was on record since 1995 as being opposed to devolution.⁷⁶ Its current position is as follows: "OCASI notes the environment has changed and is considering all the options at the table. It will support the most effective one for immigrant settlement and integration in Ontario."⁷⁷

The settlement community has a range of views on the future of COIA.

Finally, some interviewees expressed a fear that, as occurred in BC, not all the funding from the annual transfer would be directed to new or expanded programming. As the debate about the renewal of COIA expands, it will be important to hear the views of other settlement organizations and immigrant-serving groups on the renewal of COIA and, in particular, on the advantages and disadvantages of devolution.

CO-MANAGEMENT

Another option would be to renegotiate COIA along the lines of the current arrangement between CIC and the Alberta government. Settlement and integration services in that province are managed according to what some describe as co-management. In practice, this functions along the following lines:

- Each year CIC and Alberta Employment and Immigration (AEI) send out a joint request for proposals.
- Service providers have to submit only one proposal in which they identify the overall funding being sought.
- CIC and AEI officials together review each proposal and decide if it merits being funded; if so, they determine the level and how the funding will be shared between CIC and AEI.

- CIC and AEI then conclude separate agreements with service providers whose proposals have been accepted.
- Because Alberta's rules are not as restrictive, services can be provided to clients that are not eligible for CIC programs.⁷⁸

According to Margaret Overland of AEI, ongoing relations between the Alberta and federal departments are good.⁷⁹ However, SPOs are somewhat frustrated with the amount of detail required in their reports and would prefer to submit only one account of their activities.

Adapted to the Ontario context, the CIC-Alberta approach has a number of potential advantages. The possibility of providing services to groups in addition to permanent residents is certainly a strong point. Because CIC would continue to be actively involved in planning and administering settlement and integration programs, the federal government would retain its links with the settlement sector in Ontario. Co-management would represent less of a challenge to its efforts to encourage policy coherence among the provinces. Accountability would be altered somewhat if, as in Alberta, SPOs were required to submit reports to both departments. Accountability to Ontarians could be provided by requiring each government to report annually (and publicly) on its activities in the province. Community responsiveness could improve provided the two governments worked together constructively.

The co-management option has a number of potential drawbacks. For the Ontario government, increased program management resources would be required. The required increase would not be as great as under devolution, but it would be considerable; and this would not be accompanied by the advantages of devolution, namely greater autonomy for the province and clearer lines of accountability. For a co-management approach

to work effectively, what could amount to a 'double key' process for program development and funding approvals would require that the two departments demonstrate a high level of goodwill and collaboration (this has not always been present over the past two decades). For settlement agencies, the dual reporting requirement would no doubt be an irritant and would displace some of their resources away from services towards administration. All in all, implementing a co-management approach on the scale required for Ontario would be a considerable challenge.

DEEPENING THE COIA FRAMEWORK

If the preceding two options are considered too ambitious or otherwise unacceptable, a final option is to keep the main lines of the current framework—which has been a success in many respects—but agree to a number of enhancements that would be provided for in the renewed COIA and address the shortcomings that have become evident:

- **Develop a single access point for new arrivals.** The multiplicity of settlement agencies and programs in Ontario must be confusing for new arrivals. This could be alleviated by developing an initiative along the lines of Manitoba's Entry Program. The funding rules could be drafted to encourage delivery by alliances of settlement agencies.
- **More joint programs.** The Bridge Training program is a successful example of federal-Ontario collaboration. Joint programming in the important but fragmented area of language training could lead to improved client service, greater responsiveness to stakeholders and worthwhile synergies.
- **Relax the eligibility criteria**—for both programs and clients—so that funds can be spent in the

most efficient manner possible, with maximum policy coherence with existing provincial and municipal programs.

- **Improved public accountability.** The current level of reporting on CIC's settlement and integration services in Ontario is poor. The department's actual program spending in the province is not indicated in either its annual report to Parliament or the Public Accounts of Canada. Although the recently adopted 'modernized' approach is more results-focused, there is a risk that the data that SPOs will provide to CIC may have little impact. CIC should take concrete steps to improve this unsatisfactory situation. One route would be to publish an annual report, along the lines of those the Manitoba and BC governments submit each year, on settlement and integration activities in Ontario, including data on client outcomes. This would rectify a situation in which the federal government itself does less with regard to reporting requirements for Ontario than it asks of Manitoba and BC.

Because this option would focus collaboration on key programs, it would be less demanding than the second option. Such additional joint action could have a number of benefits, including creating synergies and encouraging innovation in programs and services in response to the varied—and changing—needs of newcomers. Keeping the main lines of the current framework would allow the federal government to retain its links with the extensive settlement community in Ontario. From the Ontario government's perspective, this option would not require the degree of administrative expansion that devolution or (to a lesser degree) co-management would entail. However, it would not allow Ontario the room to engage in the degree of adaptation and innovation that has occurred in Manitoba and British Columbia during the past decade. For that to occur without devolution, the

federal government would need to relax its eligibility criteria, both for the kinds of programs it is willing to fund and the clients it is willing to support.

CONCLUSION

Most intergovernmental agreements, with their legalese and frequent emphasis on process, are a dull read. The 2005 Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement is no exception. However, intergovernmental agreements often stand for a good deal more than what appears in the text. They are an attempt to capture an understanding between the parties—a kind of compact about policy or program changes that may have a significant impact on large segments of the population. Again, COIA is not an exception. It was a major achievement directed at practical cooperation between the two governments in program development, with significant involvement on the part of the settlement sector and (unique in this policy field) municipal governments. Although implementation has been slower than many would have liked, there have been notable achievements—co-funding of Bridge Training projects and the Local Immigration Partnerships, for example. Collaborative initiatives such as these do not take shape overnight.

As the future shape of COIA is negotiated, broader issues need to be taken into account. For some, devolution is a logical move that would bring settlement services closer to the diverse target communities and allow the Ontario government to address immigrant integration in a more horizontal, flexible and accountable way. The Manitoba and BC experiences provide evidence that devolution can provide the space for innovation and adaptation to changing circumstances and the needs and views of the settlement sector. Others have reservations about the withdrawal of the federal government from managing such programs in the province that continues to receive close to half of

Canada's annual intake of immigrants. They see this as weakening further the federal government's long-standing leadership role in this policy field. As one interviewee told the author, "we are losing sight of immigration as nation building." A further issue is the potential impact of cutting many of the links between Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the settlement sector. The funding of projects in this area is not simply contracting out what could otherwise be done by public servants. The hundreds of recipients of federal funding include valued interlocutors and organizations that play an important 'bridging' role between immigrant communities and the host society.

The stakes are therefore considerable. The two governments are aware of this, as are leaders in the settlement and municipal sectors. As the renewal process proceeds, a concerted effort should be made to draw in these voices. This would help the parties keep their eye on what is the ultimate objective: improved outcomes for the hundreds of thousands of newcomers who are in the process of making Ontario and Canada their home. MC

TABLE 2. OPTIONS FOR RENEWAL OF THE CANADA-ONTARIO IMMIGRATION AGREEMENT

OPTION	POTENTIAL STRENGTHS	POTENTIAL DRAWBACKS
1. Devolution	<p>Major opportunity for Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration (MCI) to innovate and collaborate with other Ontario ministries</p> <p>Broad eligibility for services (not just permanent residents)</p> <p>Greater focus on outcomes</p> <p>Enhanced accountability through annual report (should be public) to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC)</p>	<p>Ontario required to expand considerably its capacity to administer a range of programs and hundreds of projects</p> <p>Federal government loses extensive links with settlement communities in Ontario and some of its capacity to foster policy coherence among the provinces</p>
2. Co-Management	<p>Greater opportunity to innovate than option 3</p> <p>Potential for collaboration between MCI and other Ontario ministries (though less than option 1)</p> <p>Broader eligibility for at least the services funded by Ontario</p> <p>Improved accountability if each government reported annually</p> <p>Federal government retains links—though now shared—with Ontario settlement sector</p>	<p>Ontario required to devote additional resources to program management and project funding</p> <p>'Double key' process would require high level of goodwill and collaboration</p> <p>Reporting to two governments is a potential irritant for service providers</p>
3. Deepened COIA Framework	<p>Less demanding than options 1 or 2</p> <p>Greater focus on joint programs should create synergies and encourage innovation</p> <p>Broader eligibility for at least some services (if provided for in renewed agreement)</p> <p>Federal government retains links with Ontario settlement sector</p> <p>Improved accountability if CIC began to report annually on its activities in Ontario</p>	<p>Less opportunity for innovation and collaboration between MCI and other Ontario ministries than options 1 and 2</p> <p>Eligibility not broadened as much as under option 1 (and possibly option 2)</p> <p>CIC's arduous approval and reporting processes would still apply</p>

A digital copy of this report is available at the Mowat Centre's website at www.mowatcentre.ca. To order additional printed copies of this publication, please contact us by email at info@mowatcentre.ca.

ENDNOTES

1. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. *Canada Year Book 1961* (Ottawa: Dominion Book of Statistics, 1961).
2. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview," CIC 2009a, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/pdf/research-stats/facts2008.pdf> (accessed April 8, 2010), 26.
3. The author wishes to express his appreciation to all those who agreed to be interviewed or with whom he met during the preparation of this study. He is particularly grateful to the officials of Citizenship and Immigration Canada and the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration who provided information and responded to requests for further details and explanations. He also would like to thank Matthew Mendelsohn, Shaun Young and Josh Hjartarson of the Mowat Centre for their invaluable support throughout the project.
4. The Canadian Constitution now provides for concurrent federal and provincial jurisdiction in two additional fields: old age pensions and benefits, and the export of non-renewable natural resources, forest products and electrical energy. The use of concurrency is still considerably more limited than in several other federations, including Australia and Germany. See R. Watts, *Comparing Federal Systems*, 3rd ed. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 87.
5. R.A. Vineberg, "Federal-provincial Relations in Canadian Immigration," *Canadian Public Administration*, 30, no. 2 (1987): 300.
6. J. Biles, "Integration Policies in English-Speaking Canada," in J. Biles, M. Burstein and J. Frideres (eds.), *Immigration and Integration in Canada in the Twenty-first Century* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2008), 158-59.
7. R.A. Vineberg (1987), 305-6.
8. *An Act Respecting Immigration to Canada*, RSC 1976-77, c. 52, s. 109(2). The act came into effect in 1978.
9. M. Labelle and F. Rocher, "Immigration, Integration and Citizenship Policies in Canada and Quebec: Tug of War between Competing Societal Projects," in R. Zapata-Barrero (ed.), *Immigration and Self-government of Minority Nations* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2009), 62.
10. C. Kostov, "Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971-1991) and Their Impact on Federalism," *American Review of Canadian Studies*, 38, no. 1 (2008): 93.
11. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens," CIC 1991, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/laws-policy/agreements/quebec/can-que.asp> (accessed April 6, 2010).
12. By 30 June each year, the Quebec government must inform Citizenship and Immigration Canada of the number of immigrants it plans to receive in the coming year(s); the Quebec target is then incorporated into the future immigrations levels for Canada as a whole that are reported to Parliament annually.
13. The 1991 accord was based in large measure on the provisions of the 1987 Meech Lake constitutional accord. When the latter did not meet the ratification threshold, the federal government agreed to transform the intended amendments to the Constitution into a federal-provincial agreement.
14. Citizen and Immigration Canada, "A Broader Vision: Immigration Plan—1996 Annual Report to Parliament," (Hull: Supply and Services Canada, 1995), 10.
15. For a complete list see Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration," CIC 2009b, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/annual-report2009/index.asp> (accessed April 8, 2010), section 3.
16. *Ibid.*, section 1.
17. According to the Auditor General's 2009 report, there were more than 50 different categories in PN programs at the time of the audit of the immigration program. See Auditor General of Canada, "2009 Fall Report of the Auditor General," OAG 2009, http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/English/parl_oag_200911_02_e_33203.html (accessed April 8, 2010).
18. Under the Canadian Experience Class, the following may apply for permanent resident status from within Canada: 1) temporary foreign workers who have at least two years of recent full-time skilled employment experience in Canada; 2) persons who came from other countries, obtained a Canadian degree and have at least one year of full-time skilled work experience in Canada. Lower-skilled temporary foreign workers do not have such a 'pathway' to permanent residence (and subsequently to Canadian citizenship), a distinction that a number of studies have criticized. See N. Alboim and Maytree, "Adjusting the Balance: Fixing Canada's Economic Immigration Policies," *Maytree*, <http://www.maytree.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/adjustingthebalance-final.pdf> (accessed March 31, 2010); D. Nakache and P.J. Kinoshita, "The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program: Do Short-Term Economic Needs Prevail Over Human Rights Concerns?" *IRPP Study*, no.5 (2010).
19. According to a CIC official, the proliferation of provincial nominee programs means there are now some 160 different "immigration program streams." In part because of "the confusion this causes potential newcomers," an evaluation of the provincial nominee program was underway (confidential communication to the author, May 4, 2010).
20. J. Biles, 175.
21. *Ibid.*, 166.
22. *Ibid.*, 142-46.
23. The activity streams are: needs assessment and referrals, information and awareness services, language learning and skills development, employment-related services, community connections and support services. The expected results fall under the following headings: orientation, language/skills, labour market access, welcoming communities and policy and program development (information provided by CIC).
24. The rationale was that "it was not considered essential or appropriate for CIC to continue to be directly involved in the administration of these funds." See Citizenship and Immigration Canada, *Consultations on Settlement Renewal: Finding a New Direction for Newcomer Integration* (Hull: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 1995).
25. C. Leo and M. August, "The Multilevel Governance of Immigration and Settlement: Making Deep Federalism Work," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 42, no. 2 (2009): 496.
26. The following discussion of the Manitoba agreement draws on interviews with Gerald Clément, Margot Morrish and Robert Vineberg.
27. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Canada-Manitoba Immigration Agreement," CIC 2003, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/laws-policy/agreements/manitoba/can-man-2003.asp> (accessed April 6, 2010).
28. This move was apparently not contentious and, according to one participant in the negotiations, reflected the good relationship between the federal and Manitoba ministers (Denis Coderre and Nancy Allan, respectively).
29. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Facts and Figures: Immigration Overview," CIC 2001, <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection/MP43-333-2001E.pdf> (accessed April 17, 2010), 7.
30. CIC 2009b, table 8.

31. Data from the 2009 Labour Force Survey provided by CIC.
32. Manitoba Labour and Immigration, *Manitoba Settlement Services: Annual Report 2007-2008* (Hull: Citizenship and Immigration Canada, 2008).
33. The data reported in this paragraph were provided by Margot Morrish (email to the author, April 8, 2010).
34. C. Leo and M. August, 499.
35. T. Carter, M. Morrish and B. Amoyaw, "Attracting Immigrants to Smaller Urban and Rural Communities: Lessons Learned from the Manitoba Provincial Nominee Program," *International Migration and Integration*, 9 (2008): 181.
36. CIC 2009b, section 2.
37. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Agreement for Canada-British Columbia Co-operation on Immigration," CIC 2004a, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/laws-policy/agreements/bc/bc-2004-agree.asp> (accessed April 6, 2010).
38. Government of British Columbia, "Canada-British Columbia Immigration Agreement," Welcome BC 2010a, http://www.welcomebc.ca/en/downloads/agreement_consolidated.pdf (accessed April 14, 2010).
39. BC has set a target of 5,200 provincial nominees for 2011-12, double the number (2,658) received in 2008-09. See British Columbia, "2009/10-2011/12 Service Plan Update," Ministry of Advanced Education and Labour Market Development, http://www.bcbudget.gov.bc.ca/2009_Sept_Update/sp/pdf/ministry/almd.pdf (accessed April 10, 2010).
40. As of April 2010, settlement services were being provided in 850 schools. See Government of British Columbia, "Canada and BC Sign New Immigration Agreement," Ministry of Advanced Education and Labour Market Development 2010b, http://www2.news.gov.bc.ca/news_releases_2009-2013/2010ALMD0012-000401.pdf (accessed April 17, 2010).
41. D. Hiebert, "The Economic Integration of Immigrants in Metropolitan Vancouver," *IRPP Choices*, 15, no.7 (2009): 13.
42. Government of British Columbia, "2007 Year in Review," Welcome BC 2007, http://www.lineardesign.ca/clients/att_general/welcome_bc_yir.pdf (accessed April 17, 2010).
43. Government of British Columbia 2010b
44. Government of British Columbia, Agreement for Canada-British Columbia on Immigration: 2007-2008 Annex B – Annual Report (Hull: Citizenship and Immigration, 2008), 38.
45. Government of British Columbia 2010a, annex A.
46. According to one study, in 2000 CIC funding per landing for settlement and language services in BC was lower than in any other province. See Government of British Columbia, "Statistical Overview 2000-2001," BC Coalition for Immigrant Integration, n.d., [http://www.ocasi.org/downloads/Report%20Card%20Year-to-year%20Funding%20\(8.5x11\).doc](http://www.ocasi.org/downloads/Report%20Card%20Year-to-year%20Funding%20(8.5x11).doc) (accessed April 10, 2010). An "interprovincial report card" released in 2004 also ranked the level of BC's services in the same two areas lowest among all the provinces. See Settlement and Integration Joint Policy and Program Council, "Investing in Immigrant Settlement Programs is an investment in Canada's Future – Executive Summary Version 2," (SIJPPC, December 13, 2004).
47. Government of British Columbia 2010a, annex A.
48. C. Leo and J. Enns, "Multilevel Governance and Ideological Rigidity: The Failure of Deep Federalism," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 42, no. 1 (2009): 104.
49. T. Welsh, "Immigrant Settlement Services in British Columbia: Optimism in the Face of Many Challenges," *INSCAN*, 20, no. 2 (2006): 10.
50. The following section draws on interviews with Joan Andrew and Pamela Bryant (both former deputy ministers of the Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration [MCI]); an off-the-record interview with a senior official of MCI; and off-the-record a meeting with eight officials of Citizenship and Immigration Canada (the interviews and meeting took place in January and February 2010). This section also benefits from interviews with Donald Pineau, Ratna Omidvar, and Debbie Douglas and Amy Casipullai.
51. At the time of the 2001 census the unemployment rate of immigrants who had arrived during the previous five years was 11.8 percent, compared to 5.9 per cent for Canadian-born Ontarians. Data provided by Ontario MCI.
52. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Immigration Ministers sign letter of intent for a Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement," CIC 2004b, <http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?cctr.sj1D=&mthd=advSrch&cctr.mnthndVI=&nid=84719&cctr.dpt1D=&cctr.tp1D=&cctr.lc1D=&cctr.yrStrtVI=&cctr.kw=citizenship&cctr.dyStrtVI=&cctr.aud1D=&cctr.mnthStrtVI=&cctr.yrndVI=&cctr.dyndVI=> (accessed April 15, 2010).
53. D. Pineau. Former official of Citizenship and Immigration Canada. April 1, 2010 (by telephone).
54. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement," CIC 2005a, <http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/DEPARTMENT/laws-policy/agreements/ontario/ont-2005-agree.asp> (accessed April 6, 2010).
55. In 2008, 1,097 of the 110,896 persons admitted as permanent residents and destined for Ontario came through the province's PNP. See CIC 2009b, section 3.
56. Citizenship and Immigration Canada, "Canada and Ontario sign historic immigration agreement," CIC 2005b, <http://www.redshiftmedia.ca/WDS/upload/dir/jv/2005%20CIC/Canada%20and%20Ontario%20sign%20historic%20immigration%20agreement.pdf> (accessed April 6, 2010).
57. Ibid.
58. R. Omidvar. Executive Director, Maytree Foundation. February 3, 2010 (by telephone).
59. R.A. Vineberg, "History of Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration and Integration," in J. Biles, M. Burstein, J. Frideres, E. Tolley and R.A. Vineberg (eds.), *Immigration and Inclusion Across Canada* (forthcoming).
60. Information provided by CIC.
61. Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, "Ontario Bridge Training," MCI 2010, <http://www.citizenship.gov.on.ca/english/keyinitiatives/bridgetraining.shtml> (accessed April 17, 2010).
62. Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration, "2008-09 Annual Report," MCI 2009, <http://www.citizenship.gov.on.ca/english/publications/rbp2009-2010.shtml#2> (accessed April 16, 2010).
63. Omidvar, 2010.
64. D. Douglas and A. Casipullai. Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants (OCASI). March 17, 2010 (by telephone).
65. M. Siemiatycki, "The View from Ontario: Immigration, Diversity & Multi-level Government Response," *Canadian Diversity*, 8, no. 1 (2010): 39.

66. House of Commons Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, "Best Practices in Settlement Services," House of Commons 2010, <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/content/hoc/Committee/403/CIMM/Reports/RP4388396/cimmrp02/cimmrp02-e.pdf> (accessed May 6, 2010).
67. Information provided by CIC.
68. R.J. Brennan, "Ottawa Short-Changing Ontario Immigrant Programs: Province," *Toronto Star*, April 7, 2010.
69. Information provided by CIC.
70. Information provided by Ontario MCI.
71. House of Commons 2010, 8.
72. Interviewees told the author that newcomers from non-eligible categories who present themselves at language training and other courses are rarely turned away. However, creativity is sometimes required—e.g. charging non-eligible clients against the budget of MCI rather than CIC.
73. From CIC media lines (prepared in early 2009) provided to the author.
74. N. Alboim. Former deputy minister, Ontario Citizenship and Immigration. February 24, 2010.
75. N. Alboim and Maytree 2009; D. Hiebert, Harmony or Cacophony? The Many Players of Canada's Immigration System, Presentation to Metropolis National Conference (Montreal: March 19, 2010).
76. Ontario Council of Agencies Serving Immigrants, "OCASI Discussion Paper - Canada-Ontario Immigration Agreement (COIA): Drafting the vision for the sector," OCASI 2009, <http://www.ocasi.org/index.php?qid=1005> (accessed April 17, 2010).
77. Communication to the author from Roberto Jovel (Policy and Research Coordinator, OCASI), April 29, 2010.
78. This description was provided by Robert Vineberg (email to the author, March 24, 2010).
79. M. Overland. Immigration Policy and Programs, Alberta Employment and Immigration. April 9, 2010 (by telephone).

About the Author

F. Leslie Seidle is research director for the Diversity, Immigration and Integration program of the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP), Senior Policy Advisor with the Forum of Federations and a public policy consultant. He previously held senior positions in the Government of Canada, including director general of Strategic Policy and Research, Intergovernmental Affairs in the Privy Council Office (1996-2002). He was Research Director (Governance) at IRPP (1992-96) and Senior Research Coordinator for the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing (1990-91). He is the author of *Rethinking the Delivery of Public Services to Citizens* (IRPP, 1995) and numerous articles on electoral and constitutional reform, citizen participation, public management and political finance. Dr. Seidle has edited/co-edited 12 books, including *Belonging? Diversity, Recognition and Shared Citizenship in Canada* (IRPP, 2007) and the comparative study *Reforming Parliamentary Democracy* (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003).

About the Mowat Centre

The Mowat Centre for Policy Innovation is an independent, non-partisan public policy research centre located at the School of Public Policy and Governance at the University of Toronto.

The Mowat Centre undertakes collaborative applied policy research and engages in public dialogue on Canada's most important national issues, and proposes innovative, research-driven public policy recommendations, informed by Ontario's reality.

We believe a prosperous, equitable and dynamic Canada requires strong provinces, including a strong Ontario, and strong cities.

Visit us at www.mowatcentre.ca



School of Public Policy & Governance
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



525 University Avenue, Suite 820
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 2L3



School of Public Policy & Governance
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO